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Abstract—Malware detection is challenging when faced with
automatically generated and polymorphic malware, as well as
with rootkits, which are exceptionally hard to detect. In an
attempt to contribute towards addressing these challenges, we
conducted a proof of concept study that explored the use of power
consumption for detection of malware presence in a general-
purpose computer. The results of our experiments indicate that
malware indeed leaves a signal on the power consumption of a
general-purpose computer. Specifically, for the case study based
on two different rootkits, the data collected at the +12V rails on
the motherboard showed the most noticeable increment of the
power consumption after the computer was infected. Our future
work includes experimenting with more malware examples and
workloads, and developing data analytics approach for automatic
malware detection based on power consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Polymorphic malware can bypass signature-based detection
methods and simple heuristic detection techniques by slightly
changing the instructions of an existing malware sample.
These new malware instances are called variants. Although
these variants appear to be different programs from the
viewpoint of signature-based anti-virus scanners, they exhibit
similar functionality to their predecessor. Consequently, these
new malware variants can bypass traditional detection methods
until a signature for them can be identified and incorporated
into detection software [1].
Authors of malware detection systems have attempted to
address this problem by using other methods that are more
powerful than signature matching; for example, byte fre-
quency [2], general similarity measures [3], and behavioral
analysis [4] are among the proposed techniques. A common
weakness of these detection methods is that they are executed
on the same machine they are monitoring. Hence, successful
attackers could disable the monitoring software or modify it
to prevent detection after gaining entry to the system [5].
This behavior is evidenced by rootkits, a particularly insidious
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subclass of malware. Rootkits are a type of computer malware
that were created to hide themselves and elude intrusion
detection systems once they gain unauthorized access to a
computer system [6].
Previous work has also explored the idea of detecting the
presence of malware by monitoring the power consumption
of mobile devices, embedded systems, and software define
radio. However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has
explored if malware can be detected by monitoring the power
consumption on general-purpose computers.
Our goal in this paper is to prove the hypothesis that in order
to mask themselves, rootkits will require a detectable change
in the power consumption. Particularly, we are addressing the
following research question: can we detect rootkits on general-
purpose computers by analyzing only the power consumption?
To this end we built a testbed and designed an experimental
setup in which the power consumption was recorded for a se-
quence of events running on a Windows operating system. This
work focuses only on rootkits because they are commonly as-
sociated with the establishment of advanced persistent threats
and pose serious danger to our nation’s computer systems.
Preliminary results showed that malware indeed leaves a signal
on the power consumption of a general-purpose computer.
Specifically, monitoring the +12V rails on the motherboard
was the most useful for identifying the increase in the power
consumption after the general-purpose computer was infected
by malware.
The paper proceeds with related work in Section II, followed
by the experimental design in Section III, which includes
the hardware and software setups used for collecting the
power data, the experimental machine’s execution of tasks,
and descriptions of the rootkit. Section IV presents the results
of the feasibility study. Finally, conclusion and promising
directions for future research are discussed in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Several works have used power consumption metrics for
malware detection purposes. These methods have been tested
on mobile devices [7], [8], embedded systems [9], and soft-
ware defined radio [10], [11], [12].
The work by Hoffman et al. [7] explored if malware
can be detected on smartphones by analyzing their power
consumption. This method failed due to the noise caused by
unpredictable factors, such as user interaction and the mobile’s
signal strength. On the other side, the approach presented by
Yang et al. [8] demonstrated that malware can be detected
by monitoring the power consumption of smartphones. The
difference between these two works is mainly in the type of
smartphones used in the experiments. First method [7] focused
mainly on “old” devices (HTC-Nexus One and Samsung
Galaxy Nexus), while the second method [8] focused on
modern devices (Samsung Galaxy S5 and LG G2). Although
PowerTutor [13] was used for the data collection in both
works, this tool may have been updated between the time these
two experiments were conducted, influencing the precision of
the collected data and skewing the results.
Another method that monitors the power consumption on
embedded systems with the objective of detecting malware
was presented by Clark et al. [9]. Supervised machine learning
techniques, such as 3-Nearest Neighbor, Multilayer Percep-
tron, and Random Forest, were used to analyze alternating
current (AC) and to detect discrepancies among the power
profiles. Even though the proposed approach share several
similarities with this work, the main difference is that the
work in [9] focused on monitoring the AC outlet, while we are
monitoring several direct current (DC) channels. The problem
with AC is that the current changes direction periodically, and
because the current changes its direction the voltage reverses
making the analog circuits much susceptible to noise.
Similarly, power-based malware detection for software de-
fined radio was explored by Gonza´lez et al. [10], [14]. This
approach relied on extracting distinctive power consumption
signatures and used pattern recognition techniques to deter-
mine if they matched the expected behaviors. This research
was expanded, and used by the PFP firm (http://pfpcyber.com),
which developed a commercial product that detect anomalies
on a device by analyzing its power consumption. This ap-
proach can also be applicable to embedded devices [11], [12].
The main difference between this approach and our work is
that we monitor all the rails attached to the motherboard plus
the CPU, while PFP is monitoring the power consumption of
the device by placing a sensor on the processor’s board as
close to the power pins as possible.
It appears that there are no published research works fo-
cused on testing the use of power consumption monitoring in
support of malware detection in general, with respect to the
detection of rootkits in particular.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
The objective of our experiments is to analyze the power
consumption of a general-purpose computer in order to detect
the presence of rootkits. Our work is based on the hypothesis
that rootkits can be detected by the anomalies they cause in
the DC power consumption of the general-purpose computer.
Specifically, we are interested in determining if there is a
difference in the power profiles between the normal and
anomalous behavior (i.e., after infection).
A. Hardware Configuration
Our experimental system is a Dell OptiPlex 755 with a clean
installation of 32-bit Windows 7. The instrumentation for our
experiments was a Data Acquisition system (DAQ), Model
Number: USB-1608G Series [15]. The DAQ connects to the
device’s motherboard power connector, and the voltage and
current are collected on each of the DC power channels. The
communication between this machine and the experimental
machine was established through USB port. The DAQ provides
relatively high-resolution power data, is able to sample at a rate
of 250KHz, and can monitor up to 16 channels. Besides the
DAQ, we also used an eight inch ATX power extender cable
that had one male and one female 24-pin connector. The 24-
pin male connector was attached to the motherboard, and the
24-pin female connector was attached to the power supply
(PSU).
Each group of wires on the PSU were connected to a single
overcurrent protection (OCP) circuit that is called a rail. A
PSU has three voltage rails: +3.3V, +5V, and +12V. Table I
provides a list of the devices that are typically powered by
these voltage rails. The +3.3V rails or the +5V rails are
typically used by the digital electronic components and circuits
in the system [16]. Some examples of these components
are adapter cards and disk drive logic boards. On the other
hand, the disk drive motors and the fans use the +12V
rails [16]. Besides disk drive motors and newer CPU voltage
regulators, the +12V supply is used by any cooling fans in the
system [16].
TABLE I: Voltage rail usage for a general-purpose computer
Rail Devices Powered
+3.3V chipsets, some DIMMs, PCI/AGP/PCIe cards,
miscellaneous chips
+5V disk drive logic, low-voltage motors, SIMMs,
PCI/AGP/ISA cards, voltage regulators
+12V motors, high-output voltage regulators,
AGP/PCIe cards
+12V CPU CPU
Acronyms:
• SIMM = Single Inline Memory Module
• DIMM = Dual Inline Memory Module
• PCI = Peripheral Component Interconnect
• PCIe = PCI Express
• AGP = Accelerated Graphics Port
• ISA = Industry Standard Architecture
• CPU = Central Processing Unit
To ensure the power data was collected adequately, we
tested three hardware configurations. The first hardware con-
figuration monitored a total of eleven DC power channels (four
pins had a signal of +3.3V, five pins had a signal of +5V, and
two pins had a signal of +12V). When using this configuration,
the voltage levels were obtained for each of the channels that
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were monitored. However, since we were interested in power,
both the voltage and current were required. To address this
challenge, a DC voltage and current sense PCB was used.
The DC voltage and current sense PCB determines the DC
current by measuring the voltage drop across a shunt resistor,
and then converts that current to analog voltage output [17].
The PCBs were soldered to those wires on the ATX power
extender cable that we were interested in monitoring.
Leaving a total of thirteen DC power channels to be
monitored (ten of them were used to measure the current and
the other three channels were used to measure the voltage).
Since the value of the voltage was the same, we measured the
voltage as a group, that is, one voltage value for all the rails
that were +3.3V, one value for all the rails that were +5V, and
one value for all the rails that were +12V. While testing this
hardware configuration, we noticed that there were two +12V
rails that were powering the CPU of the experimental machine.
Particularly, these +12V rails were separate from the rails that
we were already monitoring on the ATX power extender cable.
These +12V rails were connected from the PSU to a 4-pin
ATX12V power connector on the motherboard. Including these
rails, we ended up monitoring a total of fifteen channels. 1
Monitoring fifteen channels at the same time was challeng-
ing because, when post-processing, we had to sum several
measured currents together. To simplify the hardware con-
figuration, we evaluated other options that could help us to
reduce the number of channels to be monitored. After some
exploring we found that all wires from the same voltage value
were soldered together on the same contact point on the power
supply. This means that all the +3.3V rails were connected to
the same contact point, and the same was true for the +5V
rails, and the +12V rails. Figure 1(left) shows the voltage
and current sense PCB that was used for the second hardware
configuration, while Figure 1(right) shows how the +12V rails
were soldered together on the same contact point on the PSU.
Fig. 1: (Left) Voltage and current sensor PCB used on the
experiments for the second hardware configuration (Right)
+12V rails soldered on the same contact point on the PSU.
1A survey of other machines was made to verify that general-purpose
computers have this 4-pin ATX12V power connector. More than 20 computers
were verified and all of them had the 4-pin ATX12V power connector.
The third hardware configuration emerged from this obser-
vation. We grouped all the +3.3V rails on the same voltage
and current sense PCB which was attached to the ATX
power extender cable; the same was done for the +5V rails
and the +12V rails. Figure 2(left) shows the third hardware
configuration, while Figure 2(right) shows how the wires from
the ATX power extender cable were hooked to the DAQ. As
can be seen from Figure 2(right), for each channel on the DAQ
we hooked a wire for the current (black wire), the voltage (red
wire), and the ground (silver wire).
Fig. 2: (Left) Third hardware configuration used during the
experiments (Right) Wires attached to DAQ.
Grouping the rails reduced the numbers of channels to be
monitored to six—three channels for measuring the current,
and the other three channels for measuring the voltage. In
addition, we also included the two +12V rails that power
the CPU. Overall, instead of monitoring fifteen channels,
we reduced the number to eight: 4 voltage channels and 4
corresponding current channels. This configuration was the
one used for the experiments and data collection described
here.
B. Software Configuration
Initially, we used a tool called TracerDAQ Pro (version
2.3.1.0), which is an out-of-the box virtual instrument that
acquires and displays data [15]. This tool ran on a different
machine (data repository) in order to provide integrity during
the experimentation process. The acquired data from the
experimental machine was stored as a CSV file on the data
repository.
As our experimental design evolved, we found that Tracer-
DAQ Pro was not suitable for obtaining precise power data. To
address this issue we developed our own Visual Basic program.
There were three advantages to using our own software versus
using the supplied software: (1) data has 16 bits of precision;
(2) we have control over the sample recording rates and
sample timing (3) we were able to make additional real-time
calculations that helped us to verify the obtained power data.
Another application used in our experiments is called
Clonezilla [18]. Clonezilla is a partition and disk imag-
ing/cloning program. This tool was used to ensure we had a
consistent, clean installation of Windows. We used Clonezilla
to create an exact copy of the master hard drive and this hard
drive was not exposed to malware.
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C. Data Collection
The power consumption of the general-purpose computer
was collected in two different scenarios: normal behavior (no
rootkit running on the system) and anomalous behavior (a
rootkit was running on the system). For the data collection
workflow, we assumed a clean installation of Windows, then
power data was collected and labeled as normal. Subsequently,
the experimental machine was infected and power data was
collected and labeled as anomalous. For this case study
we infected the general-purpose computer with two rootkits:
Alureon and Pihar.
A segregated network was created to ensure the malware
will not spread around the main network. The segregated net-
work consisted of an experimental machine, a data collection
repository, a hub, and a cellular data connection. The data
collection repository connects to the personal hotspot, and then
through the hub we shared the wireless connection with the
experimental machine. Two advantages from the use of segre-
gated network are: (1) allowing rootkits to behave normally,
while avoiding the possibility of infecting other machines
on the network; and (2) allowing us to monitor, record, and
analyze the experimental machine’s network traffic.
Wireshark was used to collect the network traffic of the
experimental machine and to validate that the experimental
machine was successfully infected with the rootkits being
tested. As part of the network traffic analysis, we organized
the protocols on the PCAP file by alphabetical order and then
focused only on the column for the Domain Name System
(DNS) protocol. From the domains that were captured, one of
them got our attention (term0l5ter12.com). Several websites
[19], [20] had this domain registered as malicious. After all
these analyses, we were certain that the experimental machine
was successfully infected with both rootkits.
To initialize the data collection process, we wrote two
scripts: a Python script that executes a sequence of events,
and a C++ program that inserted what we called a marker.
The objective of the Python script was to ensure repeatability,
while the objective of the marker was to insert a signal into
the measured power data to mark the start and end points for
each of the events. IE was chosen because the Alureon and
Pihar rootkits affect the performance of browsers [21], [22].
When the Python script is executed, it launches two markers
before the experimental machine goes idle for a minute. Then
the Python script opens ten windows of IE each with 5 seconds
delay. Figure 3 shows data collected after the Python script was
executed for the +12V CPU rail prior and after the infection
with the Alureon rootkit. These events (idle, opening IE,
booting/rebooting) were recorded during three states: (1) prior
to infection, (2) after infection, and (3) after infection plus
reboot. In order to segment these sections of the power profile,
we used the marker to stress the CPU of the experimental
machine for five seconds. The Python script places markers
in the power data before and after the events were recorded.
The advantage of using these markers is that they allow us
to understand when a particular event occurs and how long it
takes to complete its execution. This workflow was completed
three times for the four rails that were monitored.
Fig. 3: Sequence of events after the Python script was executed
The first rootkit, Alureon, also known as TDL4 or TDSS,
is a Trojan that allows an attacker to intercept incoming and
outgoing Internet traffic in order to gather confidential infor-
mation such as user names, passwords, and credit card data
[23]. There are several generations of this type of malware,
and for our experiments, we used the fourth generation [24].
Typically, it infects a computer via drive-by download through
a questionable website, often a distributor of pornography or
pirated media [25]. Once Alureon is installed on the machine,
the software searches the system for any competitor’s malware
and removes it. It also uses an encryption algorithm to hide its
communications from traffic analysis tools that are sometimes
used to detect suspicious transmissions [25]. Furthermore, this
rootkit can manipulate the master boot record (MBR) of the
computer to ensure that it is loaded early during the bootup
process so that it can interfere with the loading of the operating
system [26]. The second rootkit, which is a variant of Alureon,
is a Trojan called Purple Haze (also known as Pihar). Like
Alureon, this rootkit can modify the MBR of the machine,
as well as changing system settings and reconfiguring the
Windows registry. Its rootkit capabilities include disabling the
antivirus software to keep itself hidden [27].
D. Data Pre-processing
As part of the data pre-processing, the voltage and current
for the monitored rails were multiplied to obtain the power
consumption of the general-purpose computer. To plot and
interpret the power data, we used MATLAB. After obtaining
the power data, the next step was to separate the events based
on the start and end point.
To obtain the indexes we wrote a MATLAB script that
returns the start and end point of all the markers that appeared
on the dataset. For this case study, there are a total of eighteen
markers. Once we had the start and end point for each
event, the next step was to compare those events that were
related to each other. Specifically, we were interested in the
following comparisons: (1) when the machine was booting
prior to infection versus when the machine was rebooting
after infection; (2) idle prior to infection versus idle after
infection; (3) idle prior to infection versus idle after infection
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and reboot; (4) when opening IE windows prior to infection
versus when opening IE windows after infection (5) when
opening IE windows prior to infection versus when opening
IE windows after infection and reboot.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY RESULTS
The primary goal of this proof of concept is to determine if
there is a difference in the power consumption of a general-
purpose computer after malware infection. To prove or dis-
prove this hypothesis, several experiments were conducted and
power profiles were collected for specific events (idle, opening
IE, and booting/rebooting). This was done for the rootkits
Alureon and Pihar. For each rootkit there were three datasets.
Each dataset contains the power consumption obtained for
each of the rails that were monitored. In other words, each
dataset contains the power profiles of all the sequence of events
that were recorded for each one of the rails. The comparison
between the normal and anomalous state was done for each
of the events that were recorded on the four rails. Five graphs
were generated for each monitored rail. The x axis for each
of these graphs shows “Data Points”, which refers to the total
of power readings that were sampled every 10 milliseconds.
For example, if a graph shows 3,000 data points that would
be equivalent to 30 seconds.
A. +3.3V Rails
These rails are typically used by digital electronic com-
ponents and circuits in the system, such as memory. When
comparing the power profiles of booting prior to infection
versus when it was rebooting after infection, we noticed
that at the beginning the power consumption was lower and
subsequently both events kept their power consumption similar
to each other. Regarding the other events (idle and opening IE),
results showed that the difference in the power consumption
cannot be established by the naked eye. After analyzing all
six datasets (three datasets per rootkit), we concluded that the
+3.3V rails are not very useful for detecting different behaviors
between the normal and anomalous power profiles because
these rails are used to power up memory, and that component
does not consume as much power as the hard drive or CPU.
B. +5V Rails
For all datasets, when comparing booting prior to infection
with the rebooting after infection for +5V rails , we noticed
the same behavior as the +3.3V rails, that is the power
consumption after infection was lower at the beginning of the
initialization process, but later it kept the same pace as the
normal behavior. Hence, comparing booting prior to infection
versus booting after infection for the +5V rails is not sufficient
to distinguish between normal and anomalous behavior.
When we compared idle prior to infection versus idle after
infection with Alureon we obtained an increment in the power
consumption after the general-purpose computer was infected
for two out of the three datasets (66.67% of the time), while
for Pihar we noticed an increment in the power consumption
for all datasets (100% of the time). However, when comparing
idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and reboot
for both rootkits, we noticed that the power profiles for
both scenarios (normal and anomalous) were at the same
level. In other words, a distinguishable difference cannot be
made by the naked eye. Furthermore, when comparing all the
graphs in which the general-purpose computer was idle we
noticed a delay in the power data after the general-purpose
computer was infected. We believe this delay is because after
the infection more processes are running and this extra work
consumes more power. Figure 4 shows the power consumption
after infecting the general-purpose computer with the Alureon
rootkit. As can be seen from Figure 4, the power consumption
in the idle state was higher after the infection than prior
to infection. Hence, this comparison is a good criterion for
detecting malware through the power consumption.
Fig. 4: Power consumption for idle prior to infection vs. idle
after infection with Alureon for the +5V rails
When IE was opened prior to infection versus after the
infection with Alureon, we noticed an increment in the power
consumption after infection for two out of three datasets
(66.67% of the time). In the case of the Pihar rootkit, this
behavior was seen only in one out of three datasets (33.33% of
the time). Figure 5 shows the power consumption after opening
IE prior to infection versus after infection. From Figure 5
we can see an increment in the power consumption when
some IE windows were opened. Interestingly, this increment
was seen when some windows of IE were jammed. This was
consistent with the behavior we saw during the data collection
process and later was confirmed when analyzing the PCAP
file. Based on network traffic collected by Wireshark, we
noticed that Alureon was trying to redirect the search engine to
advertisement websites. However, when IE was opened prior
to infection versus after the infection and reboot for both
rootkits, a difference by the naked eye could not be established.
Fig. 5: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection
vs. opening IE after infection with Alureon for the +5V rails
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C. +12V Rails on the Motherboard
The +12V rails on the motherboard are used to power up the
disk drive motors and the fans. For one of the Alureon datasets
results showed that the power consumption was higher after
the infection compared to when it was booted prior to infection
(33.33% of the time). However for the other two datasets,
we saw similar behavior as in the case of +3.3V and +5V
rails. Figure 6 shows an increment in the power consumption
after the general-purpose computer was infected during the
initialization process. In the case of Pihar, an increment in
the power consumption was noticeable on two out of three
datasets (66.67% of the time).
Fig. 6: Power consumption for booting prior to infection vs.
booting after infection with Alureon for the +12V rails on the
motherboard
When comparing the idle state (idle prior to infection versus
idle after infection and idle prior to infection versus idle
after infection and reboot), results for Alureon showed an
increment in the power consumption after infection for two out
of the three datasets (66.67% of the time). Similar increment
was seen in all three datasets of Pihar (100% of the time).
Figure 7 shows an increment in the power consumption when
comparing idle prior to infection versus idle after infection
and reboot for the Alureon rootkit.
Fig. 7: Power consumption for idle prior to infection vs. idle
after infection and reboot with Alureon for the +12V rails on
the motherboard
Nonetheless, when comparing IE (IE prior to infection
versus after infection and IE prior to infection versus after
infection and reboot), results for Alureon showed that an incre-
ment in the power consumption after infection can be seen in
only one of the datasets (33.33% of the time). Figure 8 shows
an increment in the power consumption when comparing IE
prior to infection versus IE after the Alureon infection and
reboot. After analyzing the +12V rails on the motherboard,
we concluded these rails are very useful when analyzing the
normal and anomalous power profiles.
Fig. 8: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection
vs. opening IE after infection and reboot with Alureon for the
+12V rails on the motherboard
When comparing IE prior to infection versus IE after
infection for Pihar, we noticed an increment in the power
consumption after infection for one out of the three datasets
(33.33% of the time). Interestingly, when comparing IE prior
to infection versus IE after infection and reboot we noticed
the power consumption of the general-purpose computer was
higher after infection for all datasets (100% of the time).
D. +12V CPU Rails
The +12V CPU rails are separate from the +12V rails on
the motherboard (monitored in the PSU). They are used to
power the CPU or GPU of a general-purpose computer. The
+12V rails on the motherboard are used to power disk drive
motors and fans
The comparison between the power consumption when
the general-purpose computer was booting prior to infection
versus when it was booting after infection showed that at the
beginning of the initialization process the power consumption
was higher prior to infection for both rootkits. However, at
some point during the initialization, an increment in the power
consumption after infection was noticeable. This comparison
by itself does not provide information that can help us to
distinguish between normal and anomalous behavior because
of the presence of noise. Noise is expected during the booting
and rebooting process because the system is executing several
processes simultaneously, so even if the malware is present,
its challenging to differentiate between normal and anomalous
states.
In the case of idle (idle prior to infection versus after
infection and idle prior to infection versus after infection
and reboot), we noticed that the power consumption for both
rootkits in the normal and anomalous scenarios were similar.
However, there were some higher spikes after infection. We
believe these spikes were generated when the system was
executing normal “non malicious processes”. Similarly, these
spikes were also seen in the +5V rails. To be sure about the
cause of these spikes, as part of our future work, we plan to
collect other parameters such as kernel events, registry files,
or syslogs of the general-purpose computer and correlate this
information with the power consumption.
A similar behavior was noticeable during IE execution (IE
prior to infection versus after infection and IE prior to infection
versus after infection and reboot). Results showed that for both
normal and anomalous power profiles, the power consumption
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was similar. In addition, some delays were seen on the general-
purpose computer after it was infected. Figure 9 showsthe
power consumption for opening IE prior to infection versus
opening IE after infection with Alureon
Fig. 9: Power consumption for opening IE prior to infection
vs. opening IE after infection with Alureon for the +12V CPU
rails
After analyzing all six datasets (three datasets per rootkit),
we concluded that a distinguishable difference cannot be made
by the naked eye when analyzing the normal and anomalous
power profiles for the +12V CPU rails. These results are not
the ones we expected because by monitoring the CPU of the
general-purpose computer we thought these rails would be
more informative. However, we are aware that many processes
are running and this extra work consumes more power making
it difficult to establish a difference by the naked eye. However,
it is possible that the normal and anomalous power profiles
may be distinguished by using machine learning algorithms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a proof of concept whose
objective was to investigate whether malware leaves a signal
on the power consumption of the general-purpose computer.
Power data was collected for four rails (+3.3V, +5V, +12V, and
+12V CPU) in two different states (normal and anomalous)
for two different rootkits. A comparison between the power
consumption of the normal and anomalous state was made for
each of the events that were recorded.
The results showed that malware undoubtedly leaves a de-
tectable signal on the power consumption of a general-purpose
computer. The signal on the +12V rails on the motherboard
was the most useful when identifying an increment in the
power consumption after the machine was infected. Results
for Alureon showed that when the general-purpose computer
was idle (idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and
idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and reboot) in
a 66.67% of the time an increment in the power profiles was
noticeable by the naked eye, while for Pihar this increment
in power was seen in 100% of the time. For both Alureon
and Pihar, there was a 33.33% of the time in which a notable
power signal was seen after the Alureon infection when IE
was opened (IE prior to infection versus IE after infection
and IE prior to infection versus IE after infection and reboot).
In the case of Pihar, 33.33% of the time an increment was
noticeable in the power after infection when opening IE prior
to infection versus after infection. When comparing IE prior
to infection versus infection and reboot with Pihar, we noticed
an increment in the power consumption 100% of the time.
Besides the +12V rails, the +5V rails are also a valuable
parameter to obtain an increment in the power consumption
after infection. Results for Alureon showed that 66.67% of the
time there was an increment in the power consumption when
comparing idle prior to infection versus idle after infection and
when comparing IE prior to infection versus after infection.
In the case of Pihar, a noticeable increment in the power
consumption was seen 100% of the time when comparing idle
prior to infection versus idle after infection. However, when
comparing opening IE prior to infection versus after infection
with Pihar we noticed an increment in the power consumption
after infection only 33.33% of the time.
While we obtained promising results, more rootkit samples
and complex data analytics are needed to test and validate this
approach. In addition, while all the processes running on the
machine consumes power, distinguishing between the normal
and anomalous behavior for the general-purpose computer is a
challenge because this device is not limited to a certain amount
of instructions. Increasing in this way the false positives.
As part of our future work we intend to include more
rootkit samples and workloads in the experimental design and
data collection process. Furthermore, we plan to propose an
approach that can minimize the number for false positives. In
addition, we plan to incorporate machine learning techniques
to automatically distinguish between the normal and anoma-
lous power profiles and detect malware.
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